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INDEPENDENT CRAFT BREWERIES STRUGGLE 
UNDER DISTRIBUTION LAWS THAT CREATE A 




 Independent craft breweries are facing historic challenges 
under the COVID-19 pandemic. To make matters worse, many 
states prohibit a brewery from terminating a distribution contract 
with a wholesaler absent statutorily defined “good cause,” which 
typically means fraud, bankruptcy, or other illegal conduct. In this 
context, lagging sales or poor distribution performance are not 
grounds for a brewery to terminate a distribution contract. This 
means that it is nearly impossible, legally or financially, for an 
independent craft brewery to terminate a distribution contract 
with an unsatisfactory wholesaler. In essence, states have statu-
torily tipped the balance of power in favor of distributors over in-
dependent craft breweries based on the allegations that large beer 
manufacturers have too much bargaining power over distributors. 
One size does not fit all. Indeed, California is currently entertain-
ing a bill to move from a more permissive relationship between 
breweries and distributors (allowing for termination generally) to 
a much more strict good cause model that other states have adopted. 
States must re-evaluate their distribution laws and reject good 
cause standards that tie a small brewery to a distributor in perpe-
tuity. Stated plainly, good cause distribution statutes harm inde-
pendent craft breweries, competition, and ultimately consumers. 
* Daniel J. Croxall is an Associate Professor of Lawyering Skills at the 
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. He teaches the world’s first 
craft beer law class at a law school. Professor Croxall thanks Thomas Gerhart 
for his invaluable research and insights in support of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION
 Something is rotten when it comes to beer distribution—
especially for independent craft brewers.1 Numerous states arti-
ficially tip the balance of power between manufacturers and 
distributors, in favor of distributors, through the laws governing 
their distribution contracts.2 These laws essentially provide a dis-
tributor a property right in their distribution contracts to protect 
their investment; however, they also leave the manufacturer at the 
mercy of the distributor, even if such a contract is no longer a good 
fit or the distributor performs in a subpar manner.3 This is par-
ticularly challenging for the thousands of independent craft 
breweries throughout the nation. Current statutes make it all but 
impossible for an independent craft brewery to terminate—legally 
or financially—a distribution contract after execution.4 There is 
no justification for protectionist laws that benefit one tier of the 
industry, distributors, at the expense of another, independent 
manufacturers. In fact, such laws often harm consumers, who 
ultimately end up with less variety and higher prices.5
 As set forth below, distributors enjoy varying levels of pro-
tection from their given states to the detriment of independent craft 
breweries. Breweries can most often only terminate distribution 
1 The Brewers Association is the national trade group for craft breweries. 
It defines an independent craft brewery as requiring, among other things, 
that “[l]ess than 25 percent of the craft brewery is owned or controlled (or 
equivalent economic interest) by a beverage alcohol industry member that is 
not itself a craft brewer.” Craft Brewer Definition, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www. 
brewersassociation.org/statistics-and-data/craft-brewer-definition/ [https://perma 
.cc/8XR5-GHQ2]. 
2 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(a), (c) (West 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 18B-1305(d)(4) (West 2019). 
3 See Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed, Director, FTC Off. of Pol’y Plan., et al., 
to Jim Wood, Assembly Member, California State (Mar. 20, 2020) [hereinafter 
Sayyed FTC Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_doc 
uments/joint-comment-ftc-staff-doj-antitrust-division-staff-california-state-as 
sembly-concerning-california/v200008_california_beer_distribution_advocacy 
_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/E693-SJJ9] (explaining that good cause require-
ments have a disparate impact on small brewers and that implementing such 
requirements will be detrimental to the state’s brewing industry). 
4 See id.
5 See id.
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contracts for statutorily defined “good cause.”6 People are commonly 
surprised to find out that good cause in the beer manufacturer-
distributor context does not include highly relevant and practical 
considerations such as sales quotas, performance standards, or 
satisfaction of general contractual duties.7 Instead, good cause 
in most states typically means bankruptcy, fraud, or other ille-
gal conduct.8 Under these laws, breweries are stuck with their 
distributors in perpetuity, unless they can legally terminate the 
contract which usually involves paying the distributor the fair 
market value of the contract.9 Of course, very few, if any, inde-
pendent breweries can handle such an expense.10 This can leave 
small breweries in the untenable position of either sticking with 
an underperforming distributor or taking on further debt to termi-
nate the contract and move on to a more fitting distributor.11
 The growing diversity of manufacturers and products in 
the beer industry has severely diminished the policy rationale 
that originally, arguably, justified the protectionism afforded to 
distributors—especially with respect to independent craft brew-
ers.12 As set forth more fully below, the traditional justification 
for distributors receiving legislatively created contractual protec-
tions is simply that large beer manufacturers wield too much power 
over distributors.13 Big Beer truly is big: “Anheuser-Busch [now AB 
InBev] is believed to control, directly or indirectly, over 50 per-
cent of all beer sold in this country.”14 While that might be true, 
there are only a few “Big” breweries, but there are literally thou-
sands of very small breweries in the United States. The Alcohol and 
6 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(a), (c); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-
1305(a), (d)(4). 
7 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-1305. 
8 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-1305(c). 
9 Mike Drumm, Beer Distribution Agreements, BEER ATT’Y (May 14, 2019), 
https://beerattorney.com/blog/beer-distribution-agreements/ [https://perma.cc 
/4ZJG-M89V] (explaining that the ambiguous term “fair market value,” with 
regard to terminating a beer distribution agreement, typically ranges from 
three to five times the previous year’s gross margin). 
10 See id.; Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 9. 
11 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 2. 
12 Id.
13 Barry Kurtz & Bryan H. Clements, Beer Distribution Law as Compared 
to Traditional Franchise Law, 33 FRANCHISE L.J. 397, 399 (2014). 
14 Id.
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Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, the federal agency charged with 
overseeing breweries and other alcohol manufacturers, found that 
roughly 75% of the 6,400 breweries operating last year produced 
1,000 barrels or less.15 For context, only fifteen breweries in the 
United States brewed more than 6,000,000 barrels of beer, only 
twelve breweries brewed between 500,001 and 1,000,000 barrels, 
and 4,577 brewed between one and 1,000 barrels.16 As with most 
things in life, one size does not fit all, nor does it make sense, like 
legislatively protecting distributors from Big Beer manufacturers’ 
market power at the steep expense of small, independent breweries. 
 Since Congress passed the Twenty-First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, individual states regulate the 
beer industry through individualized statutory schemes.17 When 
states took the reins over alcohol, three types of alcoholic bever-
age regulatory schemes emerged: prohibition, licensing, and mo-
nopoly.18 Kansas, Mississippi, and Oklahoma were the only states 
that continued to prohibit alcohol in the post-Prohibition era.19
Licensing states adopted a three-tiered system that separated 
the manufacture (brewers), distribution (wholesalers), and retail 
tiers to protect the market from unfair trade practices that stifle 
competition.20 Monopoly states also utilized a three-tier system, 
but those states exercised a public monopoly over the sale of beer 
for off-premises consumption.21 Regardless of whether a state uses 
a licensing or monopoly system today, nearly every state regulates 
the brewer-distributor relationship.22 Whether styled as licensing 
15 ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, NUMBER OF BREWERS 
BY PRODUCTION SIZE—CY 2019 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.ttb.gov/images 
/pdfs/statistics/production_size/2019_brew_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/M2TX-NB2P]. For reference, a barrel of beer contains two kegs’ worth of beer. 
16 Id.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; Thomas A. Gerhart, Undermining the 
Law: How Uninformed Legislating Helps Big Beer Erode California’s Tied-House 
Laws, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 25, 30 (2019). 
18 A.H. MARTIN, JR. & E.E. MCCLEISH, THE MKTG. LAWS SURVEY, STATE
LIQUOR LEGISLATION 21 (1941). 
19 Id. at 21, n.10. 
20 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 30. 
21 See MARTIN & MCCLEISH, supra note 18, at 25. 
22 See Marc E. Sorini, Beer Franchise Law Summary, BREWERS ASS’N (2014), 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Beer-Franchise 
-Law-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K6S-MJW5]. 
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or monopoly systems, the hurdles contemporary laws present to 
independent craft brewers in terms of getting out of a harmful 
distribution contract are, in a word, insurmountable.23
 As set forth below, California and many other states use a 
licensing system that gives independent breweries more leeway 
to negotiate a contract cancellation.24 The majority of states use 
a more restrictive distribution scheme known colloquially in the 
beer community as “beer franchise laws.”25 Beer franchise laws 
essentially dictate the key terms of any distribution contract, such 
as what constitutes good cause to terminate a contract, and make 
it virtually impossible for a manufacturer to get out of a contract.26
California serves as an important case study. Recent legislation 
in California, backed by the distributors’ lobby, seeks to convert 
California’s current, more permissive regulatory framework to a 
strict franchise law model with respect to distribution, as has 
been adopted by other states.27 As set forth below, there is simply 
no justifiable basis for making such a change.28
 Following Prohibition, states slowly began regulating the 
brewer-distributor relationship.29 State laws regulating the rela-
tionship between a brewer and a distributor have diverged into 
three distinct categories.30 The majority of states prohibit a brewer 
from terminating a distribution agreement unless it satisfies 
statutory “good cause” requirements.31 While a bit of a misno-
mer, this Article refers to them as “pure franchise laws” with re-
spect to the beer industry. Traditional franchise laws and the 
colloquially named beer franchise laws are not the same thing, and 
23 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3. 
24 See id.; Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 400–01. 
25 See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 397–99 (noting similarities and 
differences between true franchise laws and beer distribution laws); see also 
Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3; Sorini, supra note 22. 
26 See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 402–07. 
27 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 1, 6–8; Sorini, supra note 22. 
28 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3. 
29 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020) (beginning in 
2000, instituting the first and only limitation on terminating beer distribu-
tion agreements in California). 
30 See Jeffrey M. Glazer, Starting a Brewery: A Web of Regulations, 89 
WIS. LAW. 20, 21, 24 (2016); Sorini, supra note 22. 
31 See Sorini, supra note 22; e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 1454–55 
(West 2019) (requiring ninety-day notice, time to cure, and good cause—or 
loss of license, insolvency, or noncompliance). 
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most states regulate franchises, fast-food restaurants for ex-
ample, differently than beer distributors.32 A growing minority of 
states require some form of good cause, and they utilize a variety 
of other means to regulate beer distribution laws.33 Only two 
states and the District of Columbia have not enacted any beer 
franchise laws.34
 In its 1941 study, the Works Progress Administration noted 
how alcohol legislation—if applied to other industries—would be 
unconstitutional.35 States originally embraced freedom of con-
tract and largely left beer distribution agreements unregulated.36
Over time, however, distributors lobbied states to limit a brew-
er’s ability to terminate a distribution agreement on the basis that 
Big Beer has too much power over distributors.37 The distributors’ 
ultimate goal is for states to implement a good cause require-
ment before a brewer can terminate a beer distribution agree-
ment—and the majority of states have done so.38 Such statutory 
contractual terms are harmful to independent breweries and the 
consuming public alike.39
 As briefly mentioned above, beer franchise laws implemented 
the good cause standard to correct a seeming imbalance in bargain-
ing power between brewers and distributors.40 Unfortunately, 
32 See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 13, at 397; Sorini, supra note 22. 
33 See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 30, at 24 (observing that a brewer in Wis-
consin can usually terminate a distribution agreement “for any, or no, reason”); 
see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1) (West 2018) (exempting small 
brewers from good cause requirements). 
34 See Sorini, supra note 22 (identifying Alaska and Hawaii as the only 
states that do not regulate beer franchise law). 
35 See MARTIN & MCCLEISH, supra note 18, at 19 (reasoning that selling 
alcohol is “not an inherent right, but [it] is subject to the ... legitimate exer-
cise of [state] police power”). 
36 Compare 1933 Cal. Stat. 1707 (enacting California’s first alcohol laws in 
1933), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020) (becoming California’s 
restriction on terminating a beer distribution agreement in 2000). 
37 See, e.g., S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29, 
2000) (noting that the California Beer and Beverage Distributors—an indus-
try trade group—sponsored SB 1957 to counterbalance disparate bargaining 
power between brewers and distributors). 
38 See Sorini, supra note 22. 
39 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3. 
40 See Sorini, supra note 22. 
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that standard goes too far because it indefinitely binds a brew-
ery, regardless of size or actual bargaining power, to a distribu-
tor.41 The good cause standard has a disparate impact on the 
craft brewing industry because, unlike large manufacturers, 
small manufacturers lack the financial resources to buy their way 
out of a distribution contract.42 Further, the purpose of beer fran-
chise statutes is to protect a distributor from catastrophic failure 
because of the loss of a single, large manufacturer;43 frankly, this 
is not a realistic concern in contracts between independent craft 
breweries and distributors.44 Put simply, states must reevaluate 
their beer franchise laws and move away from the good cause 
requirement to properly balance distribution agreements be-
tween independent craft brewers and distributors.45
I. RELEVANT BREWING INDUSTRY AND DISTRIBUTION BACKGROUND
 The brewing industry experienced two significant changes 
between 1970 and today that impacted the brewer-distributor rela-
tionship.46 Section I.A explains how large manufacturers devel-
oped a global beer industry but surrendered domestic market share 
along the way.47 Section I.B describes the increase in large manu-
facturer-friendly legislation that paralleled large manufacturers’ 
loss in domestic market share.48 Section I.C describes some basics 
of beer distribution and the brewery-distributor relationship.49
41 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3. 
42 Id.
43 Evan Pitchford, Relationships Between Producers, Wholesalers, and Re-
tailers: Beer Distribution and Franchise Laws in California (Part 2), CONKLE,
KREMER & ENGEL PROF. L. CORP., https://www.conklelaw.com/relationships-be 
tween-producers-wholesalers-and-retailers-beer-distribution-and-franchise-laws 
-in-california-part-2 [https://perma.cc/G7BK-9WCU]. 
44 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28 (showing seventy-one large manufac-
turers earned 58% of total retail sales in 2017 compared to 6,266 craft brew-
ers splitting 23% of retail sales); Drumm, supra note 9 (explaining that the 
ambiguous term “fair market value,” with regard to terminating a beer dis-
tribution agreement, typically ranges from three to five times the previous 
year’s gross margin). 
45 See generally Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3. 
46 Infra Sections I.A, I.B. 
47 Infra Section I.A. 
48 Infra Section I.B. 
49 Infra Section I.C. 
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A. Domestic Dominance to Globalization 
 In preparation for the Twenty-First Amendment, states en-
acted alcoholic beverage control acts, and many pre-Prohibition 
brewers resumed production.50 More than 900 breweries opened 
after Congress passed the Twenty-First Amendment.51 By 1983, 
there were less than 100 breweries operating in the United States, 
and six companies produced 92% of all domestic beer.52 Between 
1983–1998, the number of breweries in the United States jumped 
from 80 to 1500.53 While the number of brewers increased, large 
manufacturers’ market share of production decreased by 20% 
between 1983–2018.54 Additionally, the price of beer fell nearly 
$1.00 per pint between 1975–1990.55
 After 2000, a wave of mergers and acquisitions globalized 
the brewing industry.56 The globalization began with InBev’s 
2008 purchase of Anheuser-Busch, creating AB InBev—a brewery 
that was twice the size of its nearest competitor.57 As of 2014, the 
world’s ten largest brewers controlled nearly 70% of the global 
brewing industry and four brewers made up 47% of that figure.58
AB InBev purchased SAB Miller in 2018 and controlled about 
50 Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified on December 5, 1933), 
with 1933 Cal. Stat. 1707 (approved on June 3, 1933 and becoming effective 
“[i]f and when it shall become lawful under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States to manufacture, sell, ... intoxicating liquors”); see also Mapping 
the American Brewing Renaissance, VINEPAIR, https://vinepair.com/map-ameri 
can-craft-brewing-history/ [https://perma.cc/JV94-5KBP]. 
51 Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 50. 
52 History of American Beer, BEERADVOCATE, https://www.beeradvocate 
.com/beer/101/history_american_beer/ [https://perma.cc/9JJW-SEUA]. 
53 Id.; Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 50. 
54 History of American Beer, supra note 52; ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX &
TRADE BUREAU, NUMBER OF BREWERS BY PRODUCTION SIZE—CY 2018 (Apr. 4, 
2019), https://www.ttb.gov/images/pdfs/statistics/production_size/2018_brew 
_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH9Z-JPDV].
55 Jay Brooks, The Price of a Beer: 1952–2016, BROOKSTON BEER BULL.
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://brookstonbeerbulletin.com/the-price-of-a-beer-1952-2016 
[https://perma.cc/QND8-RZEC]. 
56 Erik Strøjer Madsen & Yanqing Wu, Globalization of Brewing and 
Economies of Scale 2 (Aarhus Univ. Sch. of Bus. and Soc. Scis., Econ. Working 
Paper No. 2014-23, 2014), http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/81993423/wp14_23 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3SE-MV5D]. 
57 Id. at 5–6. 
58 Id. at 6. 
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27% of the global beer market in 2019.59 Finally, AB InBev produces 
approximately 50% of all beer in the United States today.60
 Further, the distribution tier is experiencing increased 
consolidation.61 More specifically, “wholesalers now include both 
large vertically integrated firms, such as distributors owned by 
Anheuser Busch, and large horizontally integrated firms, such 
as the six California wholesale firms that are part of the Reyes Beer 
Division of Reyes Holdings, Inc.”62 Reyes Holdings, Inc. is the larg-
est beer distributor in the United States.63 To illustrate, “[w]ith 
recent California acquisitions, Reyes is estimated to distribute 
nearly 100 million cases of beer per year in California—
approximately one-third of all the beer sold in California.”64 Dis-
tribution consolidation is not a California phenomenon and is 
occurring nationwide.65 Given the difficulty of an independent 
craft brewery getting its product to market, this consolidation 
only makes it harder for the little guy.66 And distributor consoli-
dation weakens the argument that distributors need statutory 
contract protections for fear of closing up shop in the event a 
single brewery terminates a distribution contract.67
B. Increased Legislative Activity 
 During the period when large manufacturers’ domestic 
market share declined, a wave of legislative changes began to shape 
states’ beer laws in ways that favored one subset of the brewing 
59 Analyzing the Global Beer Industry 2019—ResearchAndMarkets.com,
BUS. WIRE (Sept. 9, 2019, 11:41 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home 
/20190909005737/en/Analyzing-Global-Beer-Industry-2019---ResearchAnd 
Markets.com [https://perma.cc/EF6J-UTG4].
60 Adam Davidson, Are We in Danger of a Beer Monopoly?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/magazine/beer-mergers 
.html [https://perma.cc/S49V-JBJQ]. 
61 Analyzing the Global Beer Industry 2019—ResearchAndMarkets.com, 
supra note 59. 
62 Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 5 (internal citations omitted). 
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Anton Popov, Distribution Consolidation and Pricing in the Beer Industry, 
2 (Aug. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at  http://economics.mit 
.edu/files/17765 [https://perma.cc/2YWG-WWV9]. 
66 Id. at 5. 
67 Id.
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industry—large manufacturers.68 Many states’ first changes to 
their beer laws coincided with large manufacturers’ decline in 
domestic market share.69 Even today, large manufacturers are 
seeking legislative exceptions that would give them a market 
advantage by legalizing pay-to-play activities.70
 While large manufacturers were working on regaining 
market dominance, distributors began to voice concern that their 
manufacturing counterparts overpowered the brewer-distributor 
relationship.71 For example, in 2000, the California Beer and 
Beverage Distributors (CBBD) lobbied for, proposed, and suc-
ceeded in passing legislation that regulated California’s beer 
distribution agreements for the first time.72 The CBBD proposed 
this law because “beer manufacturers have enjoyed ever increas-
ing market power over their distributors.”73 That justification 
holds no water. 
 Although this law prohibits a brewer from terminating a 
distribution agreement for its distributor’s failure to meet an 
unreasonable sales quota, the law failed to accomplish its objec-
tive.74 More specifically, California Business and Professions 
Code section 25000.7 states,
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any agreement for the sale 
or distribution of beer between a beer manufacturer and beer 
wholesaler, no sale or distribution agreement shall be termi-
nated solely for a beer wholesaler’s failure to meet a sales goal or 
68 E.g., Gerhart, supra note 17, at 33–34 (discussing four legislative excep-
tions that favor large manufacturers enacted by California between 1971 and 
1990). 
69 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25500–25512 (West 2020) (noting Cali-
fornia had not added or amended any statutes until 1973, but it has added at least 
19 new statutes and amended existing statutes at least 126 times since 1973). 
70 Compare id. § 25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623) (creating an exception 
to California’s beer laws that permits manufacturers to give glassware to retail 
locations—despite former Governor Brown vetoing a similar bill the previous 
year), with Letter from Jerry Brown, Governor, Cal. State, to Cal. State Assembly 
(Sept. 6, 2018) (“I also worry that this law creates an economic disadvantage for 
small beer manufactures [sic]”). 
71 S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000). 
72 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (enacted by SB 1957 in 2000); S.
RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 4–5 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000). 
73 S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 4. 
74 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7. 
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quota that is not commercially reasonable under the prevail-
ing market conditions.75
 Section 25000.7 thus presents large manufacturers with a 
relatively small obstacle by discouraging them from terminating 
a beer distribution agreement.76 However, large manufacturers 
can still operate with impunity and behave as if the law did not 
exist.77 Today, large manufacturers use their resources to termi-
nate—or effectively terminate—beer distribution agreements 
simply by paying the distributor to go away (a luxury few, if any, 
independent craft breweries can afford), which prompted dis-
tributors to lobby the Legislature for changes that impact all 
brewers.78 While large manufacturers’ conduct was the catalyst 
for those changes, the impact of distributors’ proposed changes 
are strangling to many craft brewers.79
C. Beer Distribution Basics 
 Manufacturers make beer; wholesalers distribute it to the 
various retail outlets the consuming public enjoy such as bars, 
restaurants, and other venues.80 Distributors take the beer from 
75 Id. § 2500.7(a). 
76 See id.
77 Jessica Infante, Reyes Makes 3rd California Wholesaler Acquisition of 2019 
with W.A. Thompson Deal, BREWBOUND (Oct. 8, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://www. 
brewbound.com/news/reyes-makes-3rd-california-wholesaler-acquisition-of-2019 
-with-w-a-thompson-deal (last visited Feb. 12, 2021); Justin Kendall, Reyes Bever-
age Acquires Another 4 Million Cases of Constellation Business in Southern 
California, BREWBOUND (Oct. 22, 2018, 4:47 PM) [hereinafter Reyes Beverage],
https://www.brewbound.com/news/reyes-beverage-acquires-another-4-million 
-cases-of-constellation-business-in-southern-california (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
78 E.g., Justin Kendall, Constellation Brands Forces Distributor Change in 
Northern San Diego County, BREWBOUND (June 7, 2018, 5:20 PM) [hereinafter 
Constellation Brands], https://www.brewbound.com/news/constellation-brands 
-forces-distributor-change-northern-san-diego-county (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) 
(explaining that Constellation Brands asked its distributor to terminate the 
distribution agreement—against the distributor’s best interest—and the dis-
tributor complied only to avoid a lengthy legal battle). 
79 Reyes Beverage, supra note 77. 
80 Marc Sorini, Understanding the Three-Tier System: Its Impacts on U.S. 
Craft Beer and You, CRAFTBEER.COM (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeer.com 
/craft-beer-muses/three-tier-system-impacts-craft-beer [https://perma.cc/7X 
H5-RKUH]. 
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the manufacturer and mark the price up to make their profits.81
Distributors must be licensed by their respective state agencies 
to engage in distribution.82 In practical terms, a manufacturer 
loses roughly 30% in profit per packaged item to the distributor 
that the manufacturer would otherwise realize in a direct to 
consumer transaction.83
 In exchange, the distributor is responsible for caring for 
the brewer’s product in terms of quality control, storage, han-
dling, and delivery.84 In addition, distributors have to move the 
beer—they have to “establish retail networks to sell the brands 
of beer that they carry.”85 Large manufacturers handle their 
own advertising at national and regional levels, but distributors 
“often provide point-of-sale promotion like enhanced product 
placement, setting up displays, conducting in-store events, and 
supplying retailers with information on the brands they repre-
sent.”86 Thus, distributors provide a much needed service to 
breweries seeking to expand retail presence.87 At its core, inde-
pendent craft breweries only enter into a distribution contract to 
move more beer and expand sales.88 Yet, in most states, lack of 
sales or movement of product is not good cause for a manufac-
turer to terminate a contract.89
 Under modern statutes, distributors typically receive certain 
contractual protections.90 While the exact protections vary among 
the states, they typically boil down to three main categories.91
First, nearly every state provides that the brewery-distributor 
81 Kary Shumway, How Do You Determine the Price of a Craft Beer? (Price 
to Distributor, Price to Retailer and Price to Consumer), CRAFT BREWING BUS.
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/business-marketing 
/determine-price-craft-beer-price-distributor-price-retailer-price-consumer/ 
[https://perma.cc/S7LG-ZN67]. 
82 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020). 
83 Shumway, supra note 81. 
84 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 5. 
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 10. 
88 Id. at 11. 
89 Id. at 7. 
90 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25000.7, 25000.9 (West 2020). 
91 See, e.g., id. §§ 25000.5, 25000.7, 25000.9. 
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relationship is exclusive to the parties to the contract.92 That means 
that once the contract is executed, the brewery cannot allow an-
other distributor to move its product within the bounds of the 
agreed upon geography—these are known as territorial protec-
tions.93 Second, distributors are often given transfer protections.94
Transfer protections limit the brewer’s ability to prevent distribu-
tors from transferring their rights to another distributor (think 
consolidation).95 Typically, brewers can be civilly liable for damages 
if they unreasonably withhold consent to the transfer.96 Lastly, 
and most importantly to this Article, distributors typically receive 
termination protections in which a brewery cannot terminate the 
contract without statutorily defined good cause.97 In practice, this 
means that if a brewery wants to terminate a contract, it is typi-
cally required to pay an X-modifier, usually three times annual 
gross, before the distributor will agree to termination.98
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
 The problem is a legislatively created power imbalance in 
favor of distributors at the expense of independent craft breweries.99
After years of unchanged statutory and regulatory schemes, the 
brewing industry is undergoing a transformation.100 Large man-
ufacturers are using their resources to drive legislative changes, 
which gives them advantages over their craft counterparts.101 Dis-
tributors reacted to large manufacturers terminating, or effectively 
terminating, distribution agreements by pursuing legislation 
that would bind all brewers.102 Craft brewers lack the resources 
92 See, e.g., id. § 25000.5. 
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., id. § 25000.9. 
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See, e.g., id. § 25000.7. 
98 See Constellation Brands, supra note 78. 
99 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28. 
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., id. at 36 n.105, 37 n.108 (citing Letter from Thomas M. Hannigan, 
Assembly Member, Cal. State, to George Deukmejian, Governor, Cal. State 
(May 25, 1990) (asking the legislature to enact a law to legitimize an illegal act 
that MillerCoors and Marine World had unknowingly engaged in sixteen years)). 
102 See, e.g., A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 98 (Cal. 
2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted) (proposing to enact a 
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to effectively defend themselves against these lobbies and, in both 
instances, large manufacturers end up harming craft brewers.103
 States across the nation have been working to find a middle 
ground between large manufacturers and craft brewers, but dis-
tributors are also weighing in on the discussion.104 In California, 
the distribution lobby imprecisely identified the problem as stem-
ming from the disparity in bargaining power between brewers 
and distributors.105 This generalization failed to account for situa-
tions where the distributor has greater bargaining power in dis-
tribution contracts, as is the case for the majority of craft brewers.106
 The CBBD’s first attempt to correct the imbalance resulted 
in a law that places a minor limitation on brewers and avoids the 
issue of good cause altogether.107 Nearly twenty years after Cali-
fornia enacted its first beer franchise law restriction, the CBBD 
asked Assembly Member Adam Gray to propose a new restriction 
with the same justification the CBBD used in 2000.108 At the 
CBBD’s request, Assembly Member Gray introduced Assembly Bill 
(AB) 1541 in the California Legislature on February 22, 2019.109
This bill embodies the debate at hand: what beer laws properly 
good cause standard that would prevent a brewer from terminating a beer 
distribution agreement unless the brewer satisfies a four-pronged test). 
103 See Reyes Beverage, supra note 77 (showing how large manufacturers 
leverage their resources to terminate beer distribution agreements); Tele-
phone Interview with the Office of Assembly Member Adam Gray, Cal. State 
(Jan. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Gray Telephone Interview] (notes on file with the 
author) (citing Constellation’s termination of that agreement as a cause to 
propose a good cause requirement for terminating beer distribution agree-
ments in California); see also Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Director, 
FTC, et al., to Wesley Chesbro, Senator, Cal. State (Aug. 24, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Ohlhausen FTC Letter] (cautioning the California Legislature against 
enacting a good cause requirement because such requirements harm smaller 
breweries and can reduce competition and increase the price of beer). 
104 Baylen Linnekin, Bad State Laws and Big Money Beer Wholesalers Are 
Still Hurting Craft Brewers, REASON (Mar. 16, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://reason 
.com/2019/03/16/bad-state-laws-and-big-money-beer-wholes/ [https://perma.cc 
/WGF2-2SZ9]. 
105 S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 3–4 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000). 
106 Id.
107 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a)–(b) (West 2020). 
108 Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103. 
109 CAL. LEGIS. INFO., BILL HISTORY AB-1541, https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov 
/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB1541 [https://perma.cc 
/ZZ6A-J8NW]. 
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balance the brewer-distributor relationship in a way that does 
not disparately impact craft brewers?110
 AB 1541 is emblematic of the fight that has occurred or is 
occurring in all states, distributors seeking to change the law in 
their favor at the expense of independent brewers.111 AB 1541 
attempts to bolster California’s already strict termination pro-
tections in favor of distributors.112 California’s current termination 
protection merely provides that missing sales goals or quotas do 
not constitute “good cause” for a brewery to terminate a contract.113
 However, AB 1541 provides that a beer manufacturer can-
not terminate, or decline to renew, a distribution contract unless 
the beer manufacturer acts in “good faith” and with “good cause” 
and the brewer has allowed for notice and cure opportunities.114
What is worse is that the burden falls on the manufacturer to 
show that it has acted in good faith and with good cause.115 Fi-
nally, in an overlay draconian twist, AB 1541 provides that the 
brewer must establish that: 
(1) There is a failure by the beer wholesaler, without reasona-
ble excuse or justification, to comply substantially with essential 
and commercially reasonable requirements of the agreement.... 
(2) The beer wholesaler was given written notice by the beer 
manufacturer of failure to comply with the agreement, includ-
ing reasonable supporting documentation. 
(3) The beer manufacturer first acquired knowledge of the 
failure described in paragraph (1) not more than __ months 
before the date notification was given to the beer wholesaler. 
(4) The beer wholesaler has been afforded __ days in which to 
submit a plan of corrective action ....116
 According to the Federal Trade Commission and the Depart-
ment of Justice Antitrust Division, “[a] manufacturer, including 
a craft brewer, could not even decline to renew a contract with a 
110 S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 4. 
111 Id. at 4–5. 
112 A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 98 (Cal. 2019) (as 
amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted). 
113 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (West 2020). 
114 A.B. 1541, at 98. 
115 Id.
116 Id.
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distributor whose performance it found unsatisfactory, without 
satisfying all of the Bill’s ‘good cause’ requirements.”117 Stated 
simply, under the proposed law and under the laws of many states, 
the brewer-distributor relationship exists in perpetuity because 
they are next to impossible to terminate.118
 While the big lobbying efforts of Big Beer and Big Distri-
bution—such as AB 1541—might play loudly to state legislators, 
the independent brewer’s interest in new legislation has far less 
money behind it, and the lack of representation results in the 
adoption of harmful legislation.119 Independent craft brewers of-
ten rely on trade associations like the California Craft Brewers 
Association (CCBA) to defend their interests in the state legisla-
tures.120 Obviously, distributors and large manufacturers often 
donate money to the legislators who introduce these bills and 
chair committees the bills must pass.121
 Current laws force craft brewers to choose between profits 
or market exposure by limiting their distribution options to either 
self-distribution or entering an ironclad pact with a distributor 
for potentially eternity.122 While the CBBD’s initial assessment 
came close to identifying the problem, it missed a critical qualifier. 
The power balance exists between large manufacturers and dis-
tributors; legislative remedies that impact all brewers harm small 
brewers and will have a dire impact on the brewing industry.123
117 Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 7. 
118 Id.
119 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28 (explaining that—in 2017—7 large 
manufacturers earned $64.8 billion in retail sales compared to 6,266 craft 
brewers splitting $26 billion); Linnekin, supra note 104. 
120 About the CCBA, CAL. CRAFT BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.california 
craftbeer.com/about-the-ccba/about-ccba-2/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4H-TC64]. 
121 E.g., Campaign Finance and Lobbying Activities, CAL. SEC’Y STATE, https:// 
www.sos.ca.gov/campaign-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/Q26G-DM6B] (document-
ing that the CBBD has donated the maximum allowable campaign donations 
to Assembly Member Gray and Senator Bill Dodd—the chairs for their houses’ 
respective governmental organization committees). 
122 Linnekin, supra note 104. 
123 See Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 8 (explaining that good 
cause requirements have a disparate impact on small brewers and that implement-
ing such requirements will be detrimental to the state’s brewing industry). 
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III. BEER FRANCHISE LAWS
 Licensing states keep brewers, distributors, and retailers 
separate and issue a multitude of licenses to the members of each 
tier.124 States like California use a modified three-tier licensing 
system that permits brewers to self-distribute but still keeps the 
three tiers separate from one another.125 Monopoly states control 
retail sales, thereby keeping brewers and distributors separate 
from the retail tier.126 Despite these differences, licensing and 
monopoly systems create circumstances where brewers may sell 
their own products, either onsite or by self-distribution, or con-
tract with a distributor to move their product.127 The system in 
place does not impact beer franchise laws because both systems 
carve out a specific place for the brewer-distributor relationship.128
 Beyond adopting a licensing or monopoly model, states have 
also developed their own bodies of law dealing with the relationship 
between brewers and distributors.129 As noted above, the majority 
of states require a brewer to have good cause before he or she can 
terminate a distribution agreement.130 For a while, some states 
opted to not regulate this relationship.131 Today, multiple minority 
approaches have developed, and these approaches diverge from 
the good cause requirement.132 Section III.A examines the good 
124 MARTIN & MCCLEISH, supra note 18, at 21–25. 
125 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357(a)–(d) (West 2020); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 25500(f)(2)(A) (West 2020). 
126 Compare, e.g., 47 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 4-491(7) (West 
2020) (“It shall be unlawful .... [f]or any manufacturer or licensed importer of 
liquor in this Commonwealth ... to sell or offer to sell any liquor in this Com-
monwealth ....”), with VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-500(2) (West 2019) (defining a 
“[b]eer wholesaler” and “beer distributor” as any wholesale license holder “of-
fering beer for sale or resale to retailers”). 
127 See Sorini, supra note 22. 
128 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-500(2). 
129 Compare, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.1501–1547(1)–(6) (West 
2020) (showing that Michigan is a licensing state), and N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 18B-1104(a1) (West 2019) (observing that, like Michigan, North Carolina is 
a licensing state), with Sorini, supra note 22 (documenting that Michigan is a 
good cause state and North Carolina has a small brewer exception). 
130 See generally Sorini, supra note 22 (noting there are thirty-four states that 
use a good cause model without any exceptions common among minority states). 
131 E.g., id. (observing that Hawaii has not adopted a beer franchise law). 
132 See generally id.
2021] INDEPENDENT CRAFT BREWERIES 419 
cause model and the problem it creates.133 Section III.B explains 
the various approaches the growing minority of states have taken 
with respect to beer franchise laws.134
A. The Good Cause Model 
 Thirty-four states impose a regulatory structure that re-
quires good cause to terminate a beer distribution agreement.135
In recent years, states like New York, Washington, and California 
have evaluated implementing good cause requirements but de-
cided against them.136 Good cause is a high bar to meet because 
it traditionally requires a brewer to show the distributor failed 
to substantially comply with the contract’s lawful requirements 
and imposes a sixty-day window to cure the noncompliance.137
 Common characteristics in the majority approach include: 
written notice of termination, opportunity to cure, no termina-
tion from a change in ownership, and a few other limitations on 
litigation and attorney’s fees.138 The burden to prove all of these 
requirements falls squarely on the brewer’s shoulders.139 Addi-
tionally, the good cause requirement permits a distributor the 
right to receive post-termination compensation from the termi-
nating brewer.140
133 Infra Section III.A. 
134 Infra Section III.B. 
135 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
136 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i) (McKinney 2013) (enact-
ing a small brewer exception to good cause requirements in 2013); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.126.020(10) (West 2009) (expanding its small brewer 
exception from 50,000 barrels to 200,000 barrels in 2009); see also CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a)–(b) (West 2020) (adopting a beer franchise law in 
2000 that did not contain a good cause requirement). 
137 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020. 
138 See Sorini, supra note 22 (listing Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Michigan, and thirty other states who have a good cause requirement and 
some combination of the other requirements listed in the text above). 
139 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 703 (West 2020) (“[N]o certificate of ap-
proval holder or manufacturer shall cancel, terminate, or refuse to continue a 
franchise, or cause a wholesale dealer to relinquish a franchise, ... unless good 
cause is shown to exist.”). 
140 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(a), (c)(1)–(5) (West 2019) (“[T]he 
franchised distributor whose franchise is threatened shall be entitled to recover 
damages from the franchisor .... includ[ing], but shall not be limited to, ... [a] 
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 Good cause requirements have produced a perverse re-
sult: a distributor need only exhibit minimum effort in its con-
tracts because statutory hurdles impair the brewer’s ability to 
terminate the agreement.141 This allows distributors to turn the 
marketing spigot on or off for a given brand on a whim.142 Laws 
that require good cause often permit a distributor to sell its dis-
tribution rights, subject to the brewer’s approval; but brewers do 
not have the same right.143 A beer distribution agreement regu-
larly persists through the sale of a brewery.144 These same beer 
franchise law provisions even permit a beer distribution agree-
ment to survive the death of the brewer.145 Ultimately, good cause 
requirements impact smaller brewers much more than their larger 
counterparts because small brewers cannot typically buy their 
way out of such contracts.146
 The good cause model not only harms independent craft 
breweries, but it is bad for the consuming public as well.147 Indeed, 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division have explained that good cause requirements in 
the beer context are “likely to diminish competition between ... beer 
wholesalers and increase manufacturers’ costs of obtaining distribu-
tion services from wholesalers; these effects, in turn, are likely to 
raise the costs of beer distribution.”148 Accordingly, consumers are 
fractional portion of the franchised distributor’s tangible assets[;] ... [l]oss of 
good will; ... [l]oss of profits[;] ... [a]ll other damages allowed under the law of this 
State; and ... [t]he reasonable counsel fees and expenses incurred in the action ....”). 
141 See Sorini, supra note 22 (listing sixteen highly restrictive characteris-
tics that are common to a “full-fledged beer franchise law[ ]” that make it in-
credibly difficult for a brewer to terminate a distribution agreement). 
142 Reyes Beverage, supra note 77. 
143 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-1305(d)(3)–(7) (West 2019) (“Good 
cause ... does not include ... [a] change in the ownership of [the brewery,] ... 
brand[,] ... [or] right to distribute a product[;] ... [s]ale or transfer of the rights 
to manufacture, distribute, or use the trade name of the brand to a [new] sup-
plier[; f]ailure of the wholesaler to meet standards of operation or performance 
that have been imposed ... unilaterally by the supplier[;] ... [t]he establishment of 
a franchise agreement between a wholesaler and another supplier[; or t]he 
desire of a supplier to consolidate its franchises.”). 
144 Id. § 18B-1305(d)(4). 
145 Id.
146 Reyes Beverage, supra note 77. 
147 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 1. 
148 Id.
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likely to see increased costs for beer under a good cause model.149
The FTC and the DOJ further explained that the proposed Cali-
fornia good cause requirement would lessen competition among 
wholesalers and brewers alike.150 Wholesaler competition would be 
lessened because once a brewery signs the distribution agreement, 
it would be nearly impossible to terminate, and the distributors 
would have little incentive to compete to sell a given brewery’s 
brands.151 In other words, distributors would be free to focus 
their attention on some brands while ignoring others, but the 
ignored brewery would not be able to terminate the contract.152
Recognizing that a statutory good cause requirement would likely 
“affect small brewers to a greater extent than larger brewers,” 
the FTC noted that consumers “may find the variety available to 
them diminished.”153
 Ultimately, the FTC and the DOJ concluded in a March 20, 
2020 letter to Assembly Member Jim Wood that California’s cur-
rent good cause bill, AB 1541, “is likely to impede competition in 
California beer distribution, to the detriment of California con-
sumers. We see no countervailing consumer protection ....”154 Ac-
cordingly, states that already have good cause statutes or those 
states considering them should review and reject such protec-
tionism. Good cause requirements are bad for independent craft 
breweries, competition, and the consuming public.155
B. Minority Approaches 
 There are three distinct minority approaches to beer dis-
tribution agreements, and they all have one commonality—they 
do not have a blanket good cause requirement.156 This growing 
minority permits brewers to terminate distribution agreements 
without good cause much like any run-of-the-mill contract.157
149 Id.
150 Id. at 8–9. 
151 See id.
152 See id. at 11–12. 
153 Id. at 9. 
154 Id. at 13. 
155 Id. at 12–13. 
156 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2, III.B.3. 
157 See, e.g., N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i) (McKinney 2019) (ex-
empting small brewers from good cause termination requirements in 2013). 
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Section III.B.1 describes how some states exempt small brewers 
from their good cause requirement.158 Section III.B.2 explains 
how other states require something less than good cause—just 
cause.159 Section III.B.3 discusses Wisconsin’s no-cause approach 
to beer franchise laws.160
1. The Small-Business Exception 
 Colorado, Indiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington, 
and—more recently—New York adopted an approach to terminat-
ing a beer distribution agreement that exempts small brewers.161
At their cores, states that employ a small business exception are 
still rooted in the good cause model; they simply exempt small 
brewers from those requirements.162
 Oklahoma expressly exempts small brewers from the good 
cause termination requirements if they produce fewer than 
25,000 barrels of beer a year.163 That is a large amount of beer. 
According to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 
(TTB), in 2019, 4577 of the 6400 breweries in the U.S. produced 
less than 1000 barrels of beer, and only 102 brewed between 
15,000 and 30,000 barrels.164 Similarly, New York also exempts 
small brewers from good cause requirements; however, it defines 
a small brewer as one that produces fewer than 300,000 barrels 
of beer annually.165 Lastly, both of these states require a small 
brewer to pay the distributor fair market value for the lost dis-
tribution rights.166
 While large manufacturers possess the financial resources 
to terminate distribution agreements, smaller brewers do not.167
158 Infra Section III.B.1. 
159 Infra Section III.B.2. 
160 Infra Section III.B.3. 
161 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1) (West 2019); N.Y.
ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i). 
162 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(B)(1)(a)–(d), (F)(1) (contain-
ing the requirements good cause, distributor notification, failure to cure, and 
certified notification of noncompliance); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4), 
(4)(c)(1) (requiring good cause, prior notification, and failure to cure). 
163 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1). 
164 ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, supra note 15. 
165 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i). 
166 Id.; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1). 
167 See Gerhart, supra note 17, at 28. 
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The FTC points out that large manufacturers are “in a better 
position to incur the legal and regulatory costs of termination, 
and may thus have a greater ability to exercise control over 
wholesalers.”168 This approach avoids the disparate impact on 
smaller brewers by not binding them to the same good cause re-
quirements as large manufacturers.169 Beer distribution laws with 
a small brewer exception address the problem of powerful, large 
manufacturers while avoiding the opposite problem of empower-
ing distributors over craft brewers.170
2. The Just Cause Model 
 This model requires something less than good cause be-
fore a brewer may terminate a distribution agreement.171 It can 
be less restrictive than the majority approach because it might 
not contain various good cause staples like notice or cure re-
quirements.172 However, it is more strict than other minority 
approaches because it implements statutory requirements be-
fore any brewer may terminate a beer distribution agreement.173
 One example of this model is Missouri—a state that de-
fines good cause as substantial noncompliance, bad faith, or that 
a governmental entity suspended the distributor’s license for a 
minimum of thirty-one days.174 Missouri uses a watered-down 
good cause requirement because a brewer may terminate a dis-
tribution agreement if the circumstances satisfy any one of the 
elements as opposed to the standard requirement that all ele-
ments are met.175 Under Missouri law, there are far fewer ter-
mination requirements than traditional good cause states, but 
all brewers—regardless of size—are subject to the statute.176
168 Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 9. 
169 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1); N.Y. ALCO. BEV.
CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i). 
170 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(B)(1)(a)–(d), (F)(1); N.Y. 
ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4), (4)(c)(i). 
171 See MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.413(5)(1)–(3) (West 2019). 
172 See id. § 407.413(2), (5)(1)–(3) (containing no notice requirements). 
173 See id. § 407.413(5)(1)–(3). 
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 Compare id., with N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i) (McKinney 
2019). 
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 This approach appears to be a middle ground between 
empowered brewers and empowered distributors. However, this 
approach does not fully address the power that large manufac-
turers have over distributors.177 While the good cause model 
does address that problem, it is too broad in its application.178 Here, 
a less-than-good cause approach is just as broad, but it does not 
do enough to address the problem of onerous burdens on inde-
pendent breweries looking to terminate contracts with poorly 
performing distributors.179
3. The Wisconsin Model 
 Wisconsin turns both the majority and other minority ap-
proaches on their heads. More closely aligned with California’s 
current approach, a Wisconsin brewer may terminate its distri-
bution agreement without good cause.180 That is where the simi-
larities end.181
 In Wisconsin, a brewer does not pay a terminated distributor 
the fair market value of the contract.182 Rather, the successor 
distributor—or the brewer’s new distributor—pays the fair mar-
ket value penalty to the terminated distributor.183 If there are 
multiple successor distributors, the new distributors divide the 
fair market value payment equally.184 Lastly, if the brewer paid 
any termination fees to the terminated distributor, the successor 
distributor deducts that amount from its payment to the termi-
nated distributor.185
 The Wisconsin model addresses the good cause approach’s 
ancillary problem in a novel way—it shifts the cost of terminating 
a beer distribution agreement from brewers to distributors.186
Although this approach ensures terminated distributors receive 
177 See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.413. 
178 See generally N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c. 
179 See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.413. 
180 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.33(10)(4)(b), (c)(1)–(4) (West 2019). 
181 See Glazer, supra note 30, at 24 (observing that a brewer in Wisconsin 
can usually terminate a distribution agreement “for any, or no, reason”). 
182 See id. 
183 See id.
184 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.33(10)(4)(b). 
185 See id.
186 Id.
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compensation for their loss, it does not address the CBBD’s con-
cerns.187 Wisconsin shifts the burden of compensation away from 
brewers and places it on distributors’ shoulders.188 If anything, 
this approach tries to deter the circumstances that lead to the 
problem without touching the problem itself.189
IV. CALIFORNIA: EMBLEMATIC OF THE BREWING INDUSTRY
 California currently fits into an amorphous category—
comprised of six states—that has some beer distribution agreement 
laws that fall short of requiring good cause while still providing 
protections to distributors.190 More specifically, current California 
law, only restricts termination “solely for a beer wholesaler’s failure 
to meet a sales goal or quota that is not commercially reasonable 
under the prevailing market conditions.”191 If the big distribu-
tion lobby has its way, AB 1541 will make it far more difficult 
for independent breweries to terminate a contract.192
 The CBBD’s justification for proposing AB 1541 is the 
same as when it proposed California’s current beer distribution 
agreement law in 2000.193 That justification also aligns with the 
majority of states’ justification for requiring good cause.194 In 
short, the justification is that brewers have too much power over 
distributors.195
 AB 1541 would align California’s beer distribution laws with 
the majority approach by restricting brewers from terminating a 
distribution agreement for anything less than good cause.196 Today, 
187 See Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103. 
188 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.33(10)(4)(b). 
189 See id.
190 See Sorini, supra note 22. 
191 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (West 2020). 
192 See A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1–2 (Cal. 2019) . 
193 Compare S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29, 
2000) (stating “the purpose of this bill is to help restore balance in the relationship 
between beer manufacturers and distributors/wholesalers by requiring that 
contractual requirements regarding sales goals and quotes be commercially 
reasonable”), with Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103 (discussing the 
CBBD’s position arises from large brewers—namely Constellation Brands—
having too much power over their distribution counterparts). 
194 See Sorini, supra note 22. 
195 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
196 See A.B. 1541 at 3–4. 
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California is at a crossroads between its current beer franchise 
laws, its history of proposed changes to those laws, and CBBD—
who is continually pushing the state toward the majority, good 
cause approach.197 Section IV.A discusses California’s current beer 
distribution franchise laws.198 Section IV.B explains the history 
of those laws.199
A. Current California Law: Senate Bill 1957 and Business and 
Professions Code Section 25000.7 
 Prior to 2000, brewers and distributors were free to con-
tract without government intervention.200 The CBBD sponsored 
Senate Bill (SB) 1957 during the 1999–2000 legislative session 
to counterbalance the disparate bargaining power between brewers 
and distributors.201 It justified the law by explaining how pow-
erful brewers had forced distributors into unfavorable contract 
terms and could terminate those agreements with little recourse.202
California’s Governor Gray Davis signed SB 1957 into law despite 
the Small Brewer’s Association contending the bill contravened 
the principle of freedom of contract.203
 SB 1957 added two provisions to the Business and Profes-
sions Code.204 First, Business and Professions Code section 
25000.7(a) (SB 1957 codified) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any agreement for the sale 
or distribution of beer between a beer manufacturer and beer 
wholesaler, no sale or distribution agreement shall be termi-
nated solely for a beer wholesaler’s failure to meet a sales goal 
or quota that is not commercially reasonable under the pre-
vailing market conditions.205
197 Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (West 2020), with A.B. 
1541 at 1–2. 
198 Supra Section IV.A. 
199 Supra Section IV.B. 
200 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a) (beginning in 2000, institut-
ing the first and only limitation on terminating beer distribution agreements 
in California). 
201 See A.B. 1541 at 1. 
202 See S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000).
203 Id. at 4. 
204 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020). 
205 Id. § 25000.7(a) (emphasis added). 
2021] INDEPENDENT CRAFT BREWERIES 427 
 Second, it defined a “beer manufacturer” as any holder of 
a brewer’s license—whether it be in-state or out-of-state—or any 
licensed importer.206 Ultimately, SB 1957 limited the circumstances 
under which a brewer could terminate a distribution agreement.207
 This statutory change handed distributors a distinct mar-
ket advantage over manufacturers in 2000.208 Despite the fact 
that sales are the sole reason for a manufacturer to enter a dis-
tribution agreement, disallowing termination for poorer than 
expected sales crucially hamstrings small manufacturers. That 
is, if the distributor underperforms on its end of the bargain, 
that is not grounds for the brewer to terminate the contract.209 In 
reality, other reasons to terminate a distribution agreement pale 
in importance compared to sales from the manufacturer’s perspec-
tive.210 In addition, this change made it exceedingly more expen-
sive for brewers to terminate unsavory distribution contracts, 
rendering termination impossible for most small manufactur-
ers.211 Litigation over the term “commercially reasonable” would 
be difficult and expensive to prove and would almost certainly be 
a question for the jury.212 Accordingly, this change removed the 
main reason a brewer would want to terminate a distribution 
agreement—poor performance—and it effectively took away the 
means to do so by making it too difficult and expensive for a 
brewer to even attempt termination.213
 Today, the CBBD believes SB 1957 (now Business & Pro-
fessions Code section 25000.7) did not go far enough in addressing 
206 Id. § 25000.7(b). 
207 Id. § 25000.7(a). 
208 See generally id.
209 See id.
210 See Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 4–5 (speaking to the dif-
ferent interests and incentives of distributors and manufactures). 
211 See James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termi-
nation Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101, 113 (1991) (“[A]nalysis of the case law 
supports [the premise] that termination laws increase the costs of termina-
tion and nonrenewal.”); Tracey A. Nicastro, How the Cookie Crumbles: The 
Good Cause Requirement for Terminating a Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 785, 796–98 (1994) (cataloguing several courts’ interpretations of 
“good cause” that limit a franchisor’s ability to terminate franchisees). 
212 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7(a). 
213 See id.
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the alleged power imbalance between brewers and distributors.214
The CBBD raised the issue of beer distribution agreements once 
more when it proposed a good cause requirement to Assembly 
Member Gray early in the 2019 legislative session.215 Assembly 
Member Gray eventually amended an existing bill to include the 
CBBD’s requested changes.216 According to Assembly Member 
Gray’s Office, the CBBD sought to change California’s distribu-
tion laws after Constellation Brands, a truly gigantic manufac-
turer, forced four distributors to sell their distribution rights to 
Constellation products in 2018 and 2019.217
B. Pushing California Toward a Good Cause Requirement 
 California did not have any laws specific to beer franchise 
agreements from 1933 until 2000.218 The first law it enacted 
opened the door for future attempts to further regulate these 
agreements.219 Section IV.B.1 discusses good cause legislation 
that a California senator nearly amended in 2005.220 Section 
IV.B.2 explains how the circumstances surrounding that 2005 
legislation resulted in similar, current legislation in 2019.221
1. AB 417: The Proposed Franchise Act That Never Was 
 In 2005, California Assembly Member Greg Aghazarian 
proposed AB 417 to include flavored malt beverages in the stat-
utory definition of “beer.”222 After the bill reached the Senate, 
214 Compare S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, SB 1957, at 3 (Cal. Aug. 29, 
2000) (“[T]he purpose of this bill is to help restore balance in the relationship 
between beer manufacturers and distributors/wholesalers by requiring that 
contractual requirements regarding sales goals and quotes be commercially 
reasonable ....”), with Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103 (proposing at 
the CBBD’s behest for the same reasons that the CBBD cited in 2000). 
215 Gray Telephone Interview, supra note 103. 
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020). 
219 See id. (California Legislature’s first enacted statute pertaining to fran-
chise laws in the alcohol industry). 
220 Infra Section IV.B.1. 
221 Infra Section IV.B.2. 
222 A.B. 417, 2005–2006 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (as amended 
on Aug. 22, 2005, but not enacted). 
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Senator Wesley Chesbro drafted an amendment to the bill that 
would tighten beer distribution laws in a manner similar to the 
recently proposed AB 1541.223 Ultimately, that amendment never 
became part of AB 417’s legislative record because Senator Chesbro 
never proposed it.224
 Before Senator Chesbro could amend AB 417, the Federal 
Trade Commission explained how his proposed changes would 
likely have catastrophic effects on California’s brewing indus-
try.225 In that letter, the directors of policy planning, economics, 
and competition advised Senator Chesbro to avoid adding a good 
cause requirement to California’s beer distribution laws.226 The 
directors identified a slew of problems that good cause require-
ments would create.227 Senator Chesbro never amended AB 417, 
the Legislature passed Assembly Member Aghazarian’s version 
of the bill, and Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed it.228
2. AB 1541: California Distributors’ Most Recent Attempt for 
a Good Cause Standard 
 Fifteen years removed from AB 417, California has forgot-
ten the lessons learned by its Legislature in 2005. The topic of 
good cause beer franchise laws in California remains in dispute 
because no official legislative record documented Senator Chesbro’s 
efforts and lessons learned.229 The lack of a legislative record set 
223 Compare Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 2, with A.B. 1541, 
2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1–2, at 98 (Cal. 2019) (as amended on 
July 11, 2019, but not enacted). 
224 See generally Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103. 
225 See id. at 3 (“One of [your] purported goals is to ‘foster vigorous and 
healthy inter-brand competition in the beer industry.’ As explained below, 
however, [your] Proposal is likely to have the opposite effect.” (internal cita-
tion omitted)). 
226 Id. at 8. 
227 Id. (citing a diminished ability to ensure distributors promote product, 
increased beer costs, and decreased beer selection). 
228 Compare A.B. 417, 2005–2006 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (as 
amended on Aug. 22, 2005, but not enacted) (passing the Legislature and 
presented to Governor Schwarzenegger on Sept. 19, 2005), with Letter from 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, Cal. State, to Members of the Cal. Assem-
bly (Oct. 07, 2005) (“I am returning AB 417 without my signature. This bill 
would codify current law and practice to treat flavored malt beverages ... con-
sistent with federal standards ....”). 
229 See supra IV.B.1. 
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the stage for AB 1541, which would align California’s beer dis-
tribution laws with the majority approach. This legislation would 
restrict brewers from terminating a distribution agreement for 
anything less than good cause.230
 Under AB 1541, California’s beer distribution laws would 
impose a four-step good cause process.231 First, the law would 
adopt the substantial compliance model.232 Second, brewers would 
need substantiating evidence and must give the distributor no-
tice of termination.233 Third, the brewer must notify the distrib-
utor of termination within a specified time period—operating 
much like a statute of limitations.234 Finally, the distributor 
could provide a corrective action plan and cure the deficiency 
within a specified period of time.235 A brewer may terminate a 
distribution agreement only after it satisfies all four criteria, 
barring the distributor does not cure the deficiency.236
V. PROPOSAL
 Keeping the alleged problem—that large brewers have too 
much power over distributors—in mind, the majority of states 
have overcorrected to the good cause model.237 This model shifts 
the balance of power strongly in favor of distributors, which is 
likely to harm a state’s brewing industry, competition, and 
therefore consumers.238 While this approach appears to address 
the problem, it creates the opposite problem: distributors have 
too much power over small brewers.239
 States have realized the harm that the current good cause 
requirement may bring, and the winds are shifting away from 
that model.240 While the just cause and Wisconsin models impose a 
230 A.B. 1541, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019) (as 
amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted). 
231 Id. at 3. 
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 4. 
235 Id. at 3. 
236 Id.
237 See generally Sorini, supra note 22. 
238 Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 8; see Sayyed FTC Letter, 
supra note 3, at 12. 
239 See id. at 11–12. 
240 See supra Section III.A. 
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lighter requirement than the rigorous good cause model, neither 
of these models address the problem.241 Under both of those 
models, large manufacturers are still able to leverage their 
strength over distributors.242
 The small business exception adequately resolves the 
problem without creating the ancillary problem that a pure good 
cause model does.243 By exempting small brewers, a state can 
still implement the rigorous good cause requirements without 
impacting small, independent craft breweries.244 Further, the 
small business exception is a dynamic alternative because it al-
lows a state to specify the size requirements for a small brewer 
and modify that threshold as it sees fit.245
 If states implement the small business exception properly, 
they would address distributors’ concerns—that brewers have 
too much power over distributors—while not harming small 
brewers or the independent brewing industry.246 This approach 
focuses on the problem—how large manufacturers’ resources 
permit them free reign in beer distribution agreements—but 
avoids trapping small breweries in unbreakable pacts.247 Essen-
tially, creating a small business exception insulates distributors 
from the impact of large, globalized manufacturers that termi-
nate distribution agreements.248 Distributors could rest easy 
knowing large manufacturers cannot take advantage of them, 
241 See supra Sections III.B.1–2. 
242 See id.
243 See generally Benefits of Beer Franchise Laws, NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS 
ASS’N, https://www.nbwa.org/government/benefits-of-beer-franchise-laws [https:// 
perma.cc/KEM4-EFNP]. 
244 See supra Section III.B.1. 
245 Memorandum from Beth Hatef of McDermott Will & Emery LLP on 
Accommodation of Small Small Brewers in State Beer Franchise Laws, (July 
2015) available at https://www.brewersassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015 
/07/State-Law-Small-Brewer-Accommodations-Updated-7-27-2015.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2021). 
246 See Ohlhausen FTC Letter, supra note 103, at 8 (noting that a good 
cause requirement “may affect smaller brewers to a greater extent than larger 
brewers, because larger brewers may be in a better position to incur the legal 
costs of termination”). 
247 Id.
248 See Sayyed FTC Letter, supra note 3, at 9. 
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and small breweries would benefit from increased competition 
and market growth.249
CONCLUSION
 The main problem with the good cause model, as it per-
tains to independent craft breweries, is that the model seeks to 
solve a power imbalance that simply does not exist between in-
dependent craft breweries and distributors.250 And while the 
market power of large manufacturers might be harmful to dis-
tributors, one size does not fit all in this context.251 As the FTC 
noted, the burdens that the good cause model imposes “upon 
brewers do not seem calibrated to address any particular bar-
gaining asymmetries between brewers and wholesalers, and we 
are pessimistic that they could.”252
 States should, in fact, engage in calibration. Legislatures 
should re-examine their distribution laws to satisfy Big Distri-
bution’s concerns of asymmetrical bargaining power with large 
breweries, but states need not sweep independent craft brewer-
ies into that bin. It is time to stop taking the lobbyists’ words for 
it. States must reject the good cause model to allow their inde-
pendent craft breweries to thrive. 
249 See The Great Debate: The Three-Tier System Is Fundamentally Broken,
THE GROWLER (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.growlermag.com/the-great-debate-the  
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